

October 17, 2000
 \64\TG\The Road to Tonkin Gulf.1
 Scratchpad on Chapters Two and Three

(Write for half an hour, automatic, without stopping: exercise: 5:30 AM)

The road to Tonkin Gulf:

In 1958 I was introduced to the missile gap: the "vulnerability gap," reflecting the vulnerability of non-alert bombers to bomber attack, perhaps supplemented by some submarine missiles and ICBMs.

What makes *faits accomplis* attractive: the sharp difference in response time of an organism, a person, a system, a bureaucracy, a military unit, between an alert state and a non-alert state. The alert state is costly and exhausting to maintain for an extended period of time, so most of the time, when a capability for very fast response is not needed, the system is non-alert. The repertoire of action-sequences, responses, of which it is "capable" (over time) is not available in a short period of time. It takes time, not only to recognize the external state that requires a response, but to decide what response to choose, to begin to alert and prepare the various components of the system involved in the response, and to begin to initiate the response sequence. (In the alert state, all these phases are very foreshortened in time required).

Thus, when the system is non-alert, it may be possible to change the external situation so greatly and so decisively during the interval in which the "adversary" is incapable of response, that no response available to the adversary after that period is adequate to regain the previous status quo. Or, at best, some response might do so, but only at very great cost, or uncertainty, with a possibility of disaster. A new "status quo" has been achieved, by a successful *fait accompli*. It can be defended--especially by an alert defender--at lower cost, more effectively, with greater prospect of success, by the new "occupier" than it can be attacked or recovered by the previous "possessor" of the "commanding heights."

Thus there is a great premium on achieving surprise, on moving to change an external situation decisively while the opposing system is still non-alert, thus on denying it warning (the type of signals of approaching or possible danger or crisis that will trigger a shift from non-alert to alert, and then to defensive response). A major factor in the ability to do this is the length of time it takes messages conveying warning indications or signals from their origin to central command points where a response will be chosen. This is the "secret" revealed by studies of command and control; the analogy between an individual, say, fighting a duel or in a battle, and a large system, is often crucially misleading because the time required for internal communication within the individual is so short that it can be disregarded, abstracted from, as if communication were instantaneous--say, at the speed of light, like radio waves--and thoroughly reliable. That is never true in a large system, even when communication is by radio. For long distances, it usually involves several sequential transmissions to reach the center, and at each of these some time is involved in handling and

relay, with possibilities (often realized) for human and mechanical error. Even a very urgent message may take hours to arrive (or fail to arrive altogether, being misdirected) over a system intended to transmit it within minutes.

Thus, ICBMs (or even bombers, if they can avoid giving early and certain warning) that can deliver a coordinated attack--not simultaneously, as hoped for, but arriving within an interval of a few tens of minutes--with thermonuclear warheads (covering large areas, and compensating for large miss distances) can destroy a large system of bombers on the ground, not only if they are non-alert but even if they are so alert that a highly reliable warning signal would permit them to be airborne in, say, twenty minutes.

One of Albert Wohlstetter's conceptual breakthroughs was to observe that the response time--from non-alert to alert, for bombers or missiles, or even in an alert state--would depend on the uncertainty or ambiguity of the warning signal (indicating the approach of an attacking force, or indicating the intention to launch such an attack). That signal, he observed, would be in all circumstances to some extent equivocal, ambiguous. The more so, the less quickly and decisively the bombers on the ground would respond, either by getting airborne (reducing their vulnerability to attack) or by starting their retaliatory missions: given the cost and possibly disastrous results of "false alarms." Problems requiring attention were to increase the timeliness and reliability of warning (reducing false alarms as well as assuring early warning of an actual attack: two requirements in practical conflict with each other), reducing response time, and also providing useful responses that were less costly or dangerous so that a higher rate of false alarms could be tolerated. (Thus, Wohlstetter urged a system of "launch under positive control," so that bombers could be launched with assurance, based on training and discipline, that they would not go to target unless a later, positive order directed them to do so, reflecting a more reliable amount of information than provided by the earliest warning and a level of command authority higher than their own base, which could authorized the launch but not an attack).

This problem caught my attention in 1958-60, given my prior focus on the analysis of decision-making under uncertainty. As Wohlstetter conceptualized it, uncertainty was inescapable and at the very heart of the problem, and at the same time, the decision, in principle in the hands of a single individual, was the most fateful in the life of the human species, whose existence could be ended (or decimated) by the wrong choice, or even by the "right" one. (Whether one individual, or one nation, or a small group of nations, or all the leadership groups represented in the UN together, should possess such a destructive power, has only rarely been addressed in this country in the last half-century; as the first and leading nuclear weapons state, we have generally regarded this situation as an irreversible fait accompli: even though it was arrived at much more sequentially and over a longer period of time--from 1942 to perhaps 1958, for the U.S., and perhaps 1968 for the Soviet Union)--than almost anyone realizes, every step of the way having been decided upon in great secrecy.

[No good! 1 hour. I can't go on this way! Now, briefly: The point is:

I studied decision-making under uncertainty at Harvard, in my senior year and in the Society of Fellows. "Analyzing how people make decisions when they don't know for sure what would happen as a result of their decisions. How could they criticize their own actions, under these conditions? How could they learn from their mistakes and failures and improve the course of their behavior?"

Work backwards again:

My concern from 1958 to 1961 was how to deter the Soviet Union from launching a surprise nuclear attack on the United States. In particular, how to prevent the possibility of a surprise nuclear attack on the bases of the Strategic Air Command which would eliminate the ability of the US to retaliate against the Soviet Union.

Backwards. In September 1961 I became aware that the problem I [and most of the RAND Corporation, along with large parts of the Air Force, and some fraction of the electorate, to whom JFK had appealed in the campaign of 1960ⁱ] had been preoccupied with--the challenge of deterring a Soviet surprise nuclear attack, by making it impossible for a Soviet attack including a large number of ICBMs to destroy US capability to retaliate--was illusory. Contrary to a consensus of the intelligence community (the Army and Navy dissenting) the Soviets had not acquired a significant missile capability at all. They had at that time four non-alert ICBMs. An assumption that had gone almost unquestioned throughout the Fifties¹ was that the Soviet Union would bend every effort and spare no expense to acquire a disarming nuclear capability against the US as quickly as it was technically feasible to do so. In September 1961 it suddenly became clear that the Soviet leaders had acted upon, indeed had possessed, no such intention. Their aims, their priorities, their sense of their overriding needs, were clearly very different from our image of them.

Again: Jesus Christ, I can't stop myself. Obviously there's no room for any of this in this book. The point I had in mind was that secrecy had helped work a massive deception on the American public, even on those with Top Secret clearances (or especially on them! And SI clearances didn't help! On the contrary, it fed the delusion, as happened in the Cuban Missile Crisis, where the absence of SI was a major factor in producing surprise. What did finally help were K clearances, for satellite recon: but that didn't lead to enlightening the public.)

And, having intended to go for breakfast to Inn K, again I've delayed too long, ignoring the signal from the timer. 11:25. Hopeless. (Don't say that).

[Suppose I now--after the news on Friday the Thirteenth that an OSA had just been passed, and with the prospect of revelations in the fall [Quemoy crisis? BNSP and memos?

¹ Until the Army and Navy began to question it after 1958, a stance that the Air Force, and much of RAND, including me, regarded as an almost treasonous reflection of their parochial budgetary interests. This was an inference, as it turned out, that very much better fitted the position of the Air Force: and one might say, of RAND.

Questions for Gilpatric? Missing parts of PP? Westy-State cables? Cuba II notes? Notes on GEOP, JSCPs?]-focus this book, and the background to the Tonkin Gulf, on the issue of Secrecy. Telling Secrets, Exposing Lies. This would mean not aiming, fundamentally, at revealing the "true history of the Vietnam War" (the evidentiary record is still inadequate to "prove" my hypotheses either on JFK, LBJ, or Nixon) or more specifically, the true policy of Nixon; or the realities and dangers of the nuclear arms race. But at the capability and propensity of the Executive Branch--abetted by Congress and the media, and the public (and adversaries and allies)--to keep secrets, to pursue a secret foreign policy; and at the dangers of this, and the need for all of these groups to challenge it. The advantages of democracy, the dangers and costs of abridging it, and the fact that secrecy of foreign and military policy negates democracy in a most dangerous way.

secrecy again
 (A ruler with an effective Official Secrets Act is a king. He is not only beyond accountability, rules by divine right, effectively by decree; and can effectively commit the country to war, on his own will and choice, whatever the Constitution says: the attribute of monarchy the Founders most wanted to avoid.

And the worst cost of kings, as Tom Paine pointed out, is unnecessary wars, and their prolongation and expansion, all results of "the pride of kings." (JFK in Cuban Missile Crisis--though not, Bay of Pigs! Which however, resulted from covert capability and practices! See lies in campaign--and Vietnam (failure to get out); LBJ in Vietnam; Nixon in Vietnam) (Even Carter, hidden 1980 crisis in Iran: PDS, citing Jack Anderson memoirs).

[Common Sense, p. 29, Mentor, 1969: "In the early ages of the world, according to the scripture chronology, there were no kings; the consequence of which was, there were no wars; it is the pride of kings which throw mankind into confusion." ("Monarchy in every instance is the Popery of government.")]

[To Samuel Adams in 1803, on his writing of the Age of Reason in the days immediately preceding his arrest by Robespierre: "My friends were falling as fast as the guillotine could cut their heads off, and I every day expected the same fate...I appeared to myself to be on the death-bed, for death was on every side of me, and I had no time to lose." P. x]

So, what of these experiences deserves telling?

--Missile gap; and exposure, September 1961: "Yes, Virginia..."

My first reaction was NO; yet, a number of reasons for YES.

--Introduction to Presidential hoax (1960-61; McNamara offers to resign over telling the truth!) Deception of those with clearances, including SI.

--leak to me of existence of special clearances, specifically K (Leibman, Marshall) and T. My determination to get them; I do, that same year, late 1961, in Partridge Study. Introduction to world of special clearances. (Did I keep it, after Study? Did I have it during Cuban Missile Crisis"? I think not. I probably got it back for Crisis Study, 1964, along with Ideal. (See PSALM)

"These pictures are worth a billion dollars..." "I have all the clearances..." Ha ha. (I wasn't present, I heard about this--from Allen, or Harry?--as evidence of Kaysen's naivete.)

--Can't tell RAND of evidence, or even that I know what it is.

--Basis for giving President the benefit of the doubt; e.g., RAND did not do so for Ike on his disbelief in the Missile Gap (though his info didn't protect the Air Force from "error" they wanted to believe, given ambiguity!) (Good example of my principle later: in high ambiguity, differences of belief are strongly warped by interest; much less so, for remaining differences in low ambiguity). (Thus, effect of wishfulness is not proportional to, a linear function of, ambiguity; where there is a close convergence, though not unanimity, of opinion, given lots of evidence, not much contradiction, the actual spread is not so closely correlated with interest as when there is great divergence; it reflects differences in priors--not always correlated with interest--and thus with experience, background.)

--JSCP: secrecy of; getting; comparing to other plans, discrepancies; telling Bundy; secrecy from SecDef, President; briefing to Gilpatric; Gilpatric and me; questions to JCS; Komer on JCS; changes (Do you know anything about these questions? Like Vann and NSSM-1.

MAYBE; PROBABLY YES

--325 million; secrecy; piece of paper

MAYBE

--Secrecy of Iwakuni, false reporting to SecDef

MAYBE

--WSEG Studies, Secrecy from Sec Def ("We'll burn these before..."): Gard; my crisis study as based on these; Laos study, lace curtain (CIA); Ponturo study and Fulbright; secret: tapes of SecDef, as well as failures of communication.

(PROBABLY YES:

1964-65; report to Rostow; continuation in ISA; why I entered ISA (Crisis Study); effects of special clearances;

--Delegation: discovery in Pacific; report to Bundy; I a working group of one; Shepard; command posts; Kaysen. (LeMay). Partridge Task Force: SI, T and K. PALs. BNSP--STILL CENSORED ON C3. ISSUE IN 1964 CAMPAIGN.

YES: illustrates secrecy from President; distrust of JCS for President (opposition to PALs; the practical issue in the 64 campaign; NOTE THAT GOLDWATER AND JCS WANTED TO RISK WAR, NUCLEAR WAR, WITH CHINA, OVER VIETNAM AND OVER NUCLEAR TESTING ISSUE--THIS CAME UP DURING THE CAMPAIGN!--AND SIMULTANEOUSLY WANTED GENERAL DELEGATION, NO PALS!

But this last point probably relates more to a nuclear-focused book, the next one. Here the issue is the lies. SEE RECENTLY DECLASSIFIED DOCUMENTS (prior to this, most citations are to me).

Also, illustrates (my own high access, and) political reasons for secrecy; lies during campaign, like Vietnam; (see arms race issue, fueled by leaks from LeMay to Goldwater: Hess; my truth squad work, with Yarmolinsky. NOTE THAT ALL THESE ISSUES SHOWED THE PRESIDENT IN A BAD POSITION--COMPROMISING WITH JCS, DANGEROUSLY, AND MUCH MORE THAN HE REVEALS TO THE PUBLIC--BUT STILL SO MUCH LESS BAD THAN THE OPPONENT'S/JCS POSITION THAT IT SEEMS ESSENTIAL THAT THE PRESIDENT BE REELECTED, RATHER THAN UNDERMINED BY EXPOSURE! THAT WAS WHY I DIDN'T EVEN THINK ABOUT EXPOSING LBJ DURING THE CAMPAIGN! AND WHY I DIDN'T THINK OF GOING TO CONGRESS TO EXPOSE JFK'S DECEPTION IN 1961; YET IN THAT CASE, I COULD HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO PUBLIC EDUCATION, WITHOUT DISELECTING JFK. (What does this say about the current race? Not that one should vote for Nader! LBJ really was better than Goldwater! Jfk WAS BETTER THAN Nixon, not so much on the arms race but on Cuba and Vietnam (though bad, very bad, on both! But that criticism between elections should be unrestrained and there should be major exposes from within government! Especially if--as was probably true in 1964--this could block a bad policy by incumbent without throwing the election to his worse opponent!)

--NATO policy, against nuclear weapons, against hyped-up OB?

NO, despite analogy of political influence on Order of Battle Estimates (in this case, as in missiles, enlarging them, in contrast to 1967!)

--Berlin game, SNIE, and my proposed message to Khrushchev; Gilpatric speech; effects on Khrushchev, and on Cuban Missile Crisis?

NO

--Task Force on Limited War, trip to Vietnam? YES (explain background; easy to avoid further involvement in Vietnam because of my preoccupation with nuclear war. JUST AFTER THIS TRIP! I DISCOVERED HOAX OF MISSILE GAP (I COULD TELL THAT STORY, AS INDICATION OF SECRECY, AND K/T CLEARANCES, INABILITY TO TELL SOURCES; BUT HENCE, ABILITY OF JFK TO KEEP A LID ON DISCLOSURE TO PUBLIC OF HOW MUCH HE HAD BEEN WRONG (Despite our warnings from RAND?

YES, ON TRIP TO VN; MAYBE, ON TS BRIEFING ON MISSILE GAP.

--Earlier, my advice to Deirdre and Cox on beefing up conventional forces, Marines, reflected in JFK speech: need for a weapon system; VN as an alternative to nuclear war? (vs. Laos, where nucs might be necessary quickly)

MAYBE

--After SNIE/briefing (Berlin?)--my thesis
YES, IN SOME FORM. (Weekend work after thesis: BNSP, JSCP, Ann Arbor?
PROBABLY NO, UNLESS TO ESTABLISH MY CREDENTIALS, BRIEFLY; DOUBT IT; FOR NEXT BOOK)

--Cuban Missile Crisis: recognize that despite nuc superiority, nuc war is possible through misunderstanding, surprise, recklessness, lack of control...

Analogies: Political Influences on President; why is it a crisis, what is national interest ("I can't lose this crisis = I won't be the first President to lose a war: Pride of Kings!): MAYBE.

--SECRECY: PSALM, LACK OF SI,
MAYBE, PROBABLY YES; as revelation, and indication of effects of secrecy...

FAILURES/LIMITS OF COERCIVE DIPLOMACY, DANGERS: SEE CFR PAPER (DELIVERED TO FBI) 1970

--ARROGANT BELIEF IN RELATIONSHIP WITH KHRUSHCHEV AND ABILITY TO INTIMIDATE KHRUSHCHEV BY THREATS, underestimation of tenacity, desperation, political motives of opponent, their willingness to challenge US;

--over-estimation of opponent's control of his military subordinates, his ability to get them, or clients, to back off (SAM: see Pleiku and Tonkin Gulf), and of control over "satellite" states (AA fire; SU and China wrt VN; origins of "2d phase of war" in 1957-59;

influence of military or factions over Ho in DRV: Tet,...); conflict actually escalates due to uncontrolled actions by subordinates or client states (misread by opponent, US)

PROBABLY NOT: TOO LONG, LEAVE TO NEXT BOOK ON NUCS;
 LIKEWISE, NUCLEAR DIMENSIONS OF VIETNAM (HOPE FOR MORE
 DOCUMENTATION BY THEN)

--Dick Neustadt's Skybolt Study (encourages my 1964 nuclear crisis study; also Pentagon Papers, both by me and by Neustadt to McNamara): recall day of JFK assassination...

Bureaucratic politics against JCS, fait accompli by McNamara, to deprive USAF of warning; fools British, who are furious at being exposed in their domestic politics; thus, domestic political dimension of policy and crises, and inability to understand and foresee impact of policies, or motives, even of close allies (vs. notion of "crisis communication": see my study, which is skeptical of Schellings' "tacit communication" through deployments, threats, reprisals (Tonkin Gulf! I could use his discussion for a bad example, but no need to in this book)

MAYBE BRIEFLY, TO LEAD IN TO CRISIS STUDY AND THEN TO ISA
 AND VIETNAM; CONSIDER WHAT LESSONS TO MENTION. Also, lesson of need
 for interviews, on perspectives and motives; can't rely on documents; PP lacked these.
 Also, need for high-level interviews, as McGeorge Bundy said about my Crisis Study;
 presidential perspective crucial, not written down or known by underlings.

YES: AS INSPIRATION FOR PENTAGON PAPERS!

- Do I mention general inspiration of Neustadt's Presidential Power? The ideology of the Presidents' Men: what's good for the president is good for the country. (See my Marine readiness to fight either Israel or Egypt.)

PROBABLY YES: AS REFUTED BY THE PP AND VIETNAM. (At the same time, experience validates Neustadt focus on the President as being actually the crucial player, though not on his belief that presidential power is always benign for the country and should be guarded and enhanced, against bureaucratic players. Experience doesn't so much indicate that the bureaucratic players are better than the President: on the contrary (see arms race and Vietnam), despite their caution on intervention (which hasn't done much for us, especially in Vietnam); it points rather to the need for Congressional involvement, something Neustadt tends to ignore. (as beneath consideration?)

■ --Halperin Quemoy study: crucial to my understanding of nuclear first-use threat dimension to crises;

*Halperin's book is more
 progressive than Congress,
 on many domestic issues; but
 Congress is better*

*effectiveness trap is to
 officials what re-elevation
 is to Congress (and, and for
 campaign funds).*

*more cautious
 than Pres (if
 informal) on
 war?*

But hard to get the

*informal
 Fullbright & Congress caught on effectiveness/
 across trap (re-elevation, vs. hostile Pres).*

--crucial example of censorship hiding nature of crisis and policy; essential for this book if I were stressing the nuclear dimension, its secrecy, and the teaching effect of this crisis (along with Korea and Dienbienphu) on Nixon's nuclear reliance (and Kissinger's) and Reagan's! But since I'm not planning to highlight that in this book, it's dispensable: and a better candidate for expose this spring wrt OSA.

So, NO. (EXCEPT: AS SOMETHING I COPIED, AND A SIGNAL-- MISTAKEN!--TO NIXON THAT HALPERIN WAS IN LEAGUE WITH ME, AND (CORRECTLY) THAT I HAD MORE TO RELEASE.)

--My Crisis Study, immediately preceding my role in ISA (and overlapping with it, at first).

--Critical role of president, concealed deliberately (5412/30 Committee, Covert Operations, Plausible Denial: not only for covert operations), misleadingly neglected by Bureaucratic Politics Model (at Kennedy School, somewhat oddly under the influence of Neustadt). See Gelb and me at RAND Conference, June 1970, based on PP. Executive policy as presidential policy, though reflecting hidden compromises with the JCS (and thus, with right-wing hawks in Congress) and bids for holding or getting right-wing domestic political support in elections or Congress, and preserving macho image ("pride of kings").

--Thus, discoveries about: JFK control of choices in Cuba II; Ike in U-2 (Do I tell this? Maybe YES; PROBABLY NOT.) Ike role in Suez Crisis? MAYBE, BUT PROBABLY NOT, HERE.

MAYBE JUST: WHY I WASN'T SURPRISED OR SHOCKED TO FIND A SECRET VIETNAM POLICY BY LBJ, BY JFK (I DISCOVERED THIS LATER, IN 1967) AND BY NIXON (DISCOVERED LATE IN 1969). But the above examples don't illustrate so much a secret foreign policy, as simply the presidential role (and its secrecy).

So: PROBABLY NOT.

--Speeches for McNamara: Ann Arbor, Economic Club, NATO

NO.

¹ In the campaigns of 1964, 1968 and 1972, the voters were deliberately and effectively misled on the intentions with respect to Vietnam of at least one candidate (in 1968, both); they voted in ignorance of the relative likelihood that either one would escalate the war. Twice the majority voted for Nixon in the mistaken belief that neither candidate was likely to escalate under any circumstances; both times Nixon successfully concealed his intention (which he carried out) to threaten major escalation secretly and to carry it out if necessary. (He largely did carry out his threats between 1969-72; on the verge of doing so in 1973, he was prevented by Watergate).

In 1964, an additional major deception was LBJ's pretense that he differed entirely from Goldwater in his willingness to delegate authority to initiate nuclear war. As on Vietnam, where he did differ on the scale of the escalation he himself was ready to initiate, he did differ from Goldwater on delegation, but only on the scope of it; secretly, he had delegated authority, while giving the voters the impression that he ruled this out absolutely.

I'm not sure whether I've noticed in my own mind that this pattern of sharp deception of voters on a major foreign policy issue during the campaign--concealing either the presence or the absence of real disagreement between the candidates, deceiving the voters as to the choice they faced--applied as well to 1960, and for that matter, to 1956. In 1960, JFK campaigned against the imminence or existence of a "missile gap" which he had been told authoritatively (by us at RAND) was highly unlikely to occur; Nixon, on the other hand, was privately at least as concerned as JFK was publicly about the need to build up our retaliatory capability to prevent a missile gap, but did not say so because it would contradict the (realistic) beliefs of President Eisenhower. Moreover, JFK proposed that he would give military support to Cuban exiles against Castro; he may or may not have known what Nixon (but not the public) knew: that the Eisenhower Administration was then arming and training exiles for a covert landing in Cuba, with active involvement of Vice President Nixon. To conceal this planning--and to counter the appeal to voters of JFK's proposal--Nixon chose to denounce such an operation under any circumstances, as being aggression contrary to the UN Charter and the OAS Charter (which it was). The voters were led to believe that he would be less likely, in fact, totally unlikely, to support or mount such an operation, compared to Kennedy: which was the opposite of the truth as known to Nixon, and probably also known to Kennedy.

In 1956, Eisenhower was on the verge of initiating an atmospheric ban on nuclear testing, partly responding to overtures by Khrushchev, when his Democratic opponent Adlai Stevenson, began to campaign on this proposal. Like Nixon four years later on the Bay of Pigs, Eisenhower felt the demands of the campaign "left him no choice" after his rival had preempted this proposal but to denounce it, as dangerous to US security. After winning, he did eventually set himself on achieving such a ban, but the moment had passed for quick approval. The ban was delayed for seven years, during which both sides tested and deployed the thermonuclear warheads for massive ICBM forces. (Moral: a sufficient reason for an incumbent to pretend that he opposes a plan with which he privately agrees, is for his rival to propose it publicly first. At a minimum, this deceives the electorate as to his view of the merits of the proposal and his prior intentions. Moreover, if he wins office, it can delay by years, or indefinitely, his adoption of the plan: if it is a move toward peace or arms control. Unfortunately, when his secret support of a plan he publicly denounced involved escalation, as in 1964, the President did not hesitate to reverse himself and carry out the escalation soon after the election (just as Nixon, four years later, issued secret threats of escalation within months, and actually escalated, in secret, even earlier, within a month of taking office. Four years after that, he planned to re-escalate three months after taking his second oath of office and after signing a "peace" accord, five months after winning a landslide on the assurance that "peace is at hand" (with no expectation

1960:
Baker
U-2

RFK/LBJ
on Khrushchev

Khrushchev/NAK
on NK

at all that peace would result in Vietnam, as distinct from the absence of US ground troops).

Who but Congress - and/or press - has a chance to discuss controversy within the Admin, doubts, and evidence - and secret policies of Pres, as disclosed?

yet - can the body ^{continue to} get this info, and act on it, reveal it, so as to act on it?

How and does getting it depend on coop. of/with Admin - which regions concealing it?

(kill journalist).

If officials were more willing to make UD - Unathwarted disclosures - of classified info (info the Admin will not authorize disclosure of).

By classifying everything, Admin can cover up ~~the~~ what it is the most want to keep secret - and they can keep it secret (in legal matters) without having to explain why it needs and deserves secrecy.

(lies, evasions, errors, failures, embarrassments...
(like recent remarks/jokes: see N & press:?) (But; ...